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that is, as “equipment” defined by 
its manipulability or “handiness” to 
our being.1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
forcefully rejected “the age-old as-
sumptions that put the body in the 
world and the seer in the body, or 
conversely, the world and the body 
in the seer as in a box.”2 Similary, the 
perceptual psychologist James Gib-
son defined a realm called “ecological 
psychology,” which challenged the te-
mental existence. Presumably, we 
think with these ideas.
Of course there have been exceptions 
along the way. Baruch Spnoza, for ex-
ample, argued that our animal spirits 
(emotions) could not be so neatly 
separated from our thinking activity. 
Martin Heidegger suggested that we 
cope with the things of the world not 
symbolically but pre-theoretically—
net that there was “a world of mental 
products distinct from the world of 
material products.”3 He called such 
a position “direct perception.”
More recently the neurophenom-
enologist Evan Thompson, in drawing 
upon the insights of contemporary 
neuroscience, has proffered a more 
dynamic model of “radical embodi-
ment,” by which the nervous system, 
We often take it for granted that ar-
chitecture is a visual art. We think 
of it in visual terms. We design and 
evaluate our productions visually. 
We present our results to clients or 
design juries in a visual format. We 
publish our efforts on websites and 
in journals with graphic images. But 
do we experience a building or an 
urban environment exclusively in 
visual terms? 
The perception of one’s surroundings 
is, after all, a cross-modal or multi-
sensory event. In entering a room 
our bodies as a whole unthinkingly 
experience a panorama of stimuli: 
the fit of a door handle, the ease of a 
tread/riser ratio, the tactile pressure 
and texture of a flooring material, the 
acoustic resonance of the space, the 
hand of a fabric, the smell of materi-
als, the warmth of sunlight through 
a window, the sense of spatial rela-
tionships, or the flush of memories 
recalled. Good architects, of course, 
have always known the multiple di-
mensions of the built environment, 
even if we often reduce it to the car-
toon of a visual art.
Western philosophy has for millennia 
constructed a similar two-dimen-
sional images of ourselves. Only a 
few years ago it was commonplace 
to believe that we possess animal 
bodies and thinking minds, and there 
is scarcely a connection between the 
two. We passively survey the world 
with our retinal nerve cells, and these 
stimuli are then passed to the higher 
reaches of our brains, where they are 
converted to ideas—the gist of our 
Figure 1. Library of Celsus, Ephesus, Turkey, completed 135 CE.
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body, and environment (including 
cultural) are interwoven develop-
mental systems, in which nurture 
(culture) cannot be distinguished 
from our biological natures (genes). 
Culture is something already en-
folded or “woven into the very fabric 
of each human mind from the begin-
ning,” a part of a larger environmental 
field that at the same time shapes 
our cognitive evolution.4 
Thompson’s model, which is indica-
tive of a large body of theory that 
has grown on the back of the newer 
biological sciences, is however little 
known to architects. We still tend to 
think about design in conventional 
two-dimensional terms or with the 
traditional philosophical values of 
yesterday. But has this always been 
the case? 
Early Theories of Empathy
Let us take the example of 19th-cen-
tury philosophical theories and their 
relation to architectural practice. 
In his book The World as Will and 
Representation (1818), the Kantian 
philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer 
initiated a line of thinking that would 
have a profound effect on architectur-
al practice. He believed that all of the 
arts had to be represented by ideas, 
and architecture, in particular, by the 
ideas of gravity, cohesion, rigidity, 
and hardness—what he termed the 
“bass notes” of nature. The materials 
that the architect employs are heavy 
and gravity (a vital energy, the “will” 
of nature) wants to pull them to the 
ground. The task of the architect 
therefore resides in representing this 
conflict—that is, in creating a build-
ing system (columns, beams, arches, 
vaults) that thwarts “these insatiable 
forces of their shortest path to their 
satisfaction.”5
Although the theoretical underpin-
nings to such a view were idealistic, 
the architectural view that Schopen-
hauer presents is a highly material 
stone as an energetic expression, and 
how this activity could be enhanced 
by directing the blows in a specific 
way and framing them with bands so 
as to endow the overall composition 
with a visual “beat”—an allegory to 
the idealist view of architecture as 
“frozen music.”8 
Semper’s perspective, outlined a full 
40 years after Schopenhauer’s book 
appeared, was fully in line with con-
temporary psychological and aes-
thetic theories. His colleague at the 
ETH in Zurich, Friedrich Theodor 
Vischer, believed that architecture 
was a symbolic art, one in which the 
architect was charged with infusing 
matter with “buoyant life,” through 
the linear and planar suspension of 
its various parts. Vertical lines, he ar-
gued, elevate the human spirit, while 
curved lines move more energetically 
than straight lines. Our bodies and 
brains respond to these forces with 
“vibrations and-who knows what—
neural modifications” (his words) 
because we have a “pantheistic” urge 
to read our emotions into the forms 
of the perceptual world.9 In a doctoral 
dissertation of 1873, his son Robert 
Vischer coined a word to describe 
this process—Einfühlung, literally 
“feeling into” the forms of the artistic 
and animistic one: the active forces 
contained within materials held in 
a temporary condition of abeyance, 
a visual force-field as it were.
The architect Karl Friedrich Schinkel 
was much moved by Schopenhauer’s 
ideas, as was his protégé Karl Böt-
ticher, who over hundreds of pages 
referred to architecture as an “ideal 
organism” in which a “formless con-
dition” of matter is “resolved into a 
dynamic expression.”6 Gottfried Sem-
per, in his book Style in the Tectonic 
and Technical Arts (1860-63), took 
this animistic line of reasoning one 
step further. All architectural forms, 
he believed, are dynamic events. The 
triangular form of the Attic gable, for 
instance, exerts a downward pressure 
and activates the vertical expression 
of life inherent in the Doric column. 
The “supple and elastic strength” of 
an Ionic volute, again, mediates this 
transfer of forces (load) in a gentler 
way than its Doric counterpart: its 
particular form “offers resistance 
without violence.”7 (Figure 2 and 3) In 
one vivid passage describing the rus-
ticated blocks he used on the Dresden 
Art Gallery, he spoke of how the lithic 
forces pounded into these blocks 
with a hammer and chisel remained 
preserved or contained within the Figure 2. Ionic columns within a community well at Ephesus. 
Figure 3. Rustication detail of the Dresden Art Gallery,
66
world.10 Some 30 years later, after 
tens of thousands of pages were writ-
ten on this theme, the term became 
translated into English as “empa-
thy,” an inadequate but nevertheless 
widely accepted term today.
Robert Vischer’s term, nevertheless, 
captured an important point. When 
we perceive artistic form, our brains 
and bodies undergo an immediate 
and preconscious physiological 
and neurological response, through 
which we assign a valence or value 
to the event. We like or we don’t like 
what we are experiencing. Emotion 
(defined simply as a response of an 
organism to a stimulus) is in fact em-
bedded in the perception; emotion is 
the preconscious lens through which 
we perceive the world. The role of 
the architect or artist is to intensify 
this sensuous reaction, as Vischer 
noted, “every work of art reveals it-
self to us as a person harmoniously 
feeling himself into a kindred object, 
or as humanity objectifying itself in 
harmonious form.”11 
Space does not permit us to explore 
the many turn-of-the-century inter-
pretations of this theme—which ex-
tend down to the early teachings of 
Wölfflin’s contentions influenced 
German architectural practice at the 
time, but it also came to influence 
aesthetic theory more broadly. One 
person much impressed with the 
theory was the British writer Vernon 
Lee, who, when living in Florence, 
was interested in testing such theory 
empirically. Lee and her collaborator 
Clementina Anstruther-Thomson 
embarked on a series of experiments 
recording the physiological respons-
es of people experiencing buildings. 
(Figure 5) In measuring the responses 
of people standing before Leon Bat-
tista Alberti’s church of Santa Maria 
Novella, they noted that the tripartite 
organization of the facade prevented 
“the thorax from collapsing as much 
the Bauhaus—but two individuals 
who applied the theme of empathy 
to architecture should be noted. One 
was the art historian Heinrich Wölfflin, 
who opened his doctoral dissertation 
of 1886 with the question “How is it 
possible that architectural forms are 
able to elicit an emotion or a mood?”12 
His response is that we animate ar-
chitectural forms simply because we 
have bodies. We experience buildings 
through our bodily organizations be-
cause the perception of form sympa-
thetically works on our internal organs, 
leading to a psychological response. 
(Figure 4) In this regard, and alluding 
to Semper, Wölfflin insisted that a 
Doric column “bends its head down” in 
the exertion of assuming a load, while a 
lighter Ionic volute mitigates this effect 
because the heavy load is discharged 
into the volute, which visually acts 
as a flexible spring. He also extended 
this empathetic response to buildings 
as a whole. For instance, he preferred 
the more horizontal and wider forms 
of the Italian Gothic style over those 
of northern Gothic, because in the 
latter case, particularly with narrow 
medieval townhouses, the “squeez-
ing together, pressing upward” of the 
forms created an uneasy feeling of 
tension.13
as usual during the act of expiration,” 
how one’s respiration seems to find 
an accord with the proportions of 
the building, how the overall read-
ing of the facade forces a certain 
pressure on the feet and downward 
pressure of the head, a feeling that is 
offset by the upward springing lines 
of the arches and the resulting feeling 
of “harmonious completeness.”14 In 
retrospect, it seems remarkable how 
seriously people, even non-architects 
such as Lee, were thinking about 
architecture at this time.
Empathy and Mirror Neurons
A few years ago, in part because I had 
translated the writings of several of 
Figure 4. The Doric order of the Temple of Hephaestus, Athens, complete 415 BCE.
Figure 5. Leon Battista Alberti, Facade of Santa Maria Novella, 1456-70.
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the writers noted above, I was invited 
to a conference at the University of 
British Columbia on the theme of 
empathy. I expected the event to 
be devoted to historical and phe-
nomenological considerations of the 
theme, and I was therefore both per-
plexed and surprised to find several 
prominent neuroscientists in atten-
dance. It happened that the theme 
of empathy had suddenly come back 
into vogue with a vengeance, thanks 
to such neuroimaging technologies 
such as Positron Emission Tomogra-
phy (PET) and Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI). Scientists, with these 
new tools, were for the first time 
probing the neurological dynamics 
into how we “feel ourselves into” or 
emotionally relate to others. 
These studies were prompted in part 
by another scientific discovery that 
had taken place in a neurological 
Now let us connect these aspects 
of our being. If we watch someone 
we love hit their thumb with a ham-
mer, we grimace in an empathetic re-
sponse to their pain. If Phil Michelson 
mirrors the golf swing of his father 
( from the left side although he is 
right-handed), he becomes a highly 
proficient golfer at a precocious age. 
Together, both events suggest that 
we comprehend the world and learn 
new things through our neurological 
(preconscious) acts of simulation. We 
now know, for instance, that we see 
someone hitting their thumb with a 
hammer we map this event onto the 
area of our somatosensory cortex in 
which the nerve cells of the thumb 
are located. Children learn to ride 
a bicycle not by reading a manual 
but by watching an older sibling or 
friend at work. 
Vittorio Gallese, one of the discover-
ers of mirror neurons, argues that the 
mirror-neuron system solves a great 
many other riddles, such how we 
form a sense of self, how we socially 
identify with others, have we come 
to have spatial awareness, and even 
how we have developed language.16 
In the last regard Gallese, together 
with the linguist George Lakoff, 
have suggested that language came 
about (very late in our evolution-
ary process) not through a process 
of symbolic abstraction (so-called 
reason) but rather through real-life 
encounters with the world—that is, 
through perceptual acts of simulat-
ing the gestures of others or in learn-
ing how objects are to be responded 
to, handled, or manipulated.17 
There are many architectural impli-
cations to mirror systems, as several 
studies have shown. In one fMRI 
study in which scientists were re-
cording the mirror activity of people 
watching others being touched by 
humans and by objects, they also 
found similar mirror activity when 
people observed two inanimate ob-
jects touching one another. In their 
laboratory at the University of Parma 
in the early 1990s.15 With the use of 
electrodes inserted into the brains 
of macaques, scientists were record-
ing neurological patterns in specific 
areas of the brain while the monkeys 
were performing such tasks as grasp-
ing a peanut. While they found these 
patterns, they also found similar pat-
terns of activity in monkeys who were 
not grasping the objects, but who 
were simply watching others perform 
the act. Neurological activation was 
found in two areas that instigate the 
movements involved, but not in the 
motor cortex, where we consciously 
execute the activity. In other words, 
in watching someone else perform 
an activity, whether it is swinging 
a golf club or a hammer, we simu-
late or prompt the same muscular 
movements in our own brains—an 
act scientists have called “embodied 
simulation.”
concluding words: “Space around us 
is full of objects accidentally touch-
ing each other, that is, without any 
animate involvement. One could 
observe a pine cone falling on the 
garden bench in the park, or drips 
splashing on the leaf of a plant dur-
ing a downpour. Models of embodied 
simulation posit that the same neural 
structures involved in our own body-
related experiences contribute to the 
conceptualization of what we observe 
in the world.”18
Now consider the fact that the archi-
tect “designs” a three-dimensional 
environment in which different ma-
terials touch one another. Architects 
shape whole forms into an overall 
composition and they detail materi-
als joining one another—for instance, 
how a wall meets a ceiling or how 
in a column supports the load. One 
might argue that the intersection 
of this column and load is derived 
from rational or structural reasoning 
alone, but such an explanation does 
not explain the intense artistic effort 
that went into the creation of an Ionic 
capital or a connection for a Meisian 
building or Richard Serra sculpture. 
(Figure 6) Contemporary models 
of neuroscience suggest that we do 
simulate or animate these structural 
and material events, reaffirming what 
theorists of empathy noted more than 
a century ago (does not the Serra 
sculpture feel like a pin prick?). We 
embody the architectural experience 
literally by “feeling ourselves into” 
the design.
Embodied Design
There is still another dimension to 
this fact. In compiling another series 
of fMRI studies, David Freedberg and 
Vittorio Gallese have recently argued 
that we not only simulate these ar-
tistic events but we also simulate 
“the artist’s creative gestures, such as 
vigorous modeling in clay or paint, 
fast brushwork and signs of the move-
ment of the hand more generally.”19 
Figure 6. Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Neue Nationalgalerie, Berlin, 1968.  Detail of the pin connection 
with the Richard Serra sculpture in the background.
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They make the case that in standing 
before a Jackson Pollak painting, for 
instance, we sense or feel the en-
ergy behind the force of paint being 
splashed on the surface.
But do we not read architecture in 
a similar way? In standing before 
the Medici Palace in Florence, for 
instance, do we not feel a sense of 
awe by these enormous blocks and 
(as Semper recorded) the force of 
the hammer and chisel that worked 
them? In approaching the Dominus 
Winery, do we not read the stacks of 
gabions as heavy because (as Wölf-
flin rightly surmised) we know the 
weight of stone? (Figures 7 & 8) Do 
not the curled titanium segments of 
a Frank Gehry pavilion, conversely, 
convey to us a sense of lightness 
and freedom? In visiting a Gothic 
because another new realm has been 
opened for architectural investiga-
tion and exploration—the breadth 
and depth of human complexity. For 
too many years we have ascribed to 
a journal of architectural theory that 
has promoted this craft as a formal-
ist game intended to exploit highly 
conceptualized values that were re-
ally intended only to demonstrate 
the genius of the architect. Plato, 
for one, scoffed at such pretensions, 
at those who seek obscure and far-
flung knowledge without first under-
standing their own human natures. 
He countered such vanity by citing 
the maxim that was carved at the 
entrance of the Temple of Apollo at 
Delphi—“Know Thyself.”20 
In this regard it might be useful to 
note the work of Ellen Dissanayake. 
cathedral, do we not simulate the 
delicacy of the mason’s chisel on the 
stonework, those animating tactile 
values that John Ruskin insisted upon 
with his Lamp of Sacrifice? And is 
this not the reason why Herzog & 
De Meuron consistently modulate 
the exterior skins of their buildings, 
such as their use of weathered steel 
for the Caxia Forum or the perforated 
and indented metal panels used in 
the De Young Museum? Is it not be-
cause they intuitively understand 
that we indeed form an empathetic 
relationship with the materials of 
our built environment?
Architecture is beginning to enter a 
very interesting period—not because 
or parametric programs or the other 
technologies that presently stand 
at the disposal of the designer. It is 
This ethnologist has for years been on 
the trail of the origin of the artistic 
impulse by drawing upon evolution-
ary and anthropological evidence, 
and by citing the human predispo-
sition for ritualistic play and cer-
emonial behaviors.21 Her research 
into this predilection for making 
things “special,” which she has con-
sistently underscored, underwent 
a subtle but important change of 
direction around the beginning of 
this century, as new fields such as 
neuroaesthetics began to ponder 
similar issues. She rejected the early 
efforts of some neuroscientists to 
reduce artistic experience to formal-
ist analysis and countered with the 
very Darwinian notion that human 
artistic impulses extend back to more 
primal and pre-Paleolithic stages of 
hominin evolution, that is, they arose 
before and during “human evolu-
tion as multi-media elaborations of 
rhythmic-modal capacities that by 
means of these elaborations gave 
emotional meaning and purpose to 
biologically vital activities.”22 Hence, 
the “rhythms and modes” associated 
with artistic activities are in fact emo-
tional drives born of adaptations and 
enculturations, drives manifested 
in such things as social affiliation, 
making sense of our surroundings, 
acquiring competence in skills, and 
to the very special idea of “elaborating 
upon” something. It is only when the 
designer taps into these “cross-modal 
sensations of tactility and kinesis,” 
as Dissanayake refers to the artistic 
process, that a work of art acquires 
the charm of being both creative and 
revelatory.
With all of our emphasis on methods 
and models in architectural practice, 
perhaps we have forgotten something 
of fundamental importance about 
this art. All good design is, in a cul-
tural and personal sense, nothing 
more than what Tim Ingold refers 
to as a “variations” on our ingrained 
bodily skills.23 And at this most primi-
tive level, design is little more than Figure 7. Herzog & de Meuron, Dominus Winery, 1997.
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the embodied play of materials, col-
ors, forms, spaces, patterns, sounds, 
and other sensory values. Thus the 
task of the architect, quite simply, 
is to design an environment that is 
creative and revelatory—revelatory 
not of some arcane idea or ideo-
logical principle but allowing us to 
experience or revel in our own vital 
activities. Richard Neutra some years 
ago cautioned the architect to fore-
go “the pure aesthetics of a bygone 
brand of speculation” and embrace 
the “tools of sensory and cerebral 
stimulation professionally.”24 It is time 
for architects to take heed of this 
advice. We are the people for whom 
we design, and if we are beginning to 
gain some insights into the natures 
of our organisms, we should make 
use of them, in fact exploit what is 
it that allows people take pleasure 
in their built environments.
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